Understanding Intelligence Failure - 9781138942141

This volume comprises a selection of essays by Prof. James Wirtz on the theory of surprise in intelligence studies.

The theory of surprise offers an explanation for why weak parties in a nascent conflict are attracted to the prospect of confronting stronger opponents with a fait accompli to achieve strategic objectives that they cannot realistically expect to achieve through attritional engagements. It also explains why stronger parties are likely to be surprised by these initiatives. It links a structural explanation for surprise (the military imbalance in a conflict diad), with differences in perceptual frameworks that create the strategic, bureaucratic and cognitive conditions for surprise to occur.

The parts of the volume explore various ramifications of the theory outlined in Chapter 1. In PART I, the theory of surprise is used to generate insights into the way various state and non-state actors utilize surprise to obtain strategic objectives. This section contains material that explores 9/11, Pearl Harbor, the Kargil crisis, and the way non-state actors rely on strategic surprise as a key operational enabler. In PART II, the theory of surprise is used to explain why deterrence failure occurs in situations where strong actors are attempting to deter weaker opponents, while also identifying policy and operationally relevant indicators of impending deterrence failure. In other words, this section expands on the theory by exploring its relevance to the theory and practice of deterrence. PART III describes various ways to minimize or block the pathways to strategic surprise and deterrence failure identified by the theory of surprise.

Bringing these previously published articles and book chapters together in a single volume, makes it possible to draw the reader's attention to the theoretical and practical connections between strategic surprise and deterrence failure, and to introduce practical techniques for avoiding strategic surprise.

This volume will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, strategic studies, military studies and IR, in general.